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INtRODUCtION
My recent book Economics for the Common Good” 1 
develops a vision of economics as a moral and 
philosophical science. While covering specific 
policy topics such as the digital revolution, the fi-
nancial crisis, deregulation, antitrust, or climate 
change, it describes how economics has evolved 
over the years to become both more relevant to 
address the key challenges of our time and more 
open to other disciplines in human and social sci-
ences. Chapter III, titled “The economist in civil 
1 Tirole Jean. Économie du bien commun. 2016. Paris, France: 
Presses Universitaires de France. 672 p. Available also in Eng-
lish: Tirole Jean. Economics for the Common Good. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press. 576 p.
society”, discusses what it means to be an econo-
mist, and will be my starting point in the lecture 2.
This book, accessible to any intellectually curi-
ous reader with little or no previous knowledge of 
economics, aims at showing how economics can open 
a window on the world, and contribute to our well-
being. To this purpose, it explains how economics 
can help us understand the world and guide policy. 
2 See also Bénassy-Quéré Agnès, Blanchard Olivier Jean, Tirole 
Jean. What role for economists in policy-making? Conseil 
d’analyse économique. Notes du conseil d’analyse économique. 
2017/6;(42):1–12. This document is the English version of: 
Agnès Bénassy-Quéré et al. Les économistes dans la cité, Notes du 
conseil d’analyse économique. 2017/6;(42):1–12. Available online 
at: https://www.cairn-int.info/article-E_NCAE_042_0001—what-
role-for-economists-in.htm.
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More broadly, it argues that social scientists need 
to engage with the many challenges our society is 
facing, to help identify our key objectives and the 
tools needed to meet them.
The ambition of the economics for the common 
good is, in short, to help build institutions that 
will work in the general interest. There are many 
situations when citizens’, companies’, states’ and 
countries’ objectives diverge from the general inter-
est. So, I, as a consumer, may emit too much carbon 
dioxide, I may not protect the environment, I may 
drive too fast, I may overconsume antibiotics, I may 
fail to vaccinate my children… Every time I do so, 
I do not take into account the effect that my actions 
will have on other people. Similarly, a business or a 
bank may take undue risk and jeopardise the jobs of 
their employees and the money of their investors or, 
maybe, taxpayers as well. They may also abuse their 
market power. The state may accumulate too much 
public debt and unfunded pension liabilities, provide 
poor education, tolerate inequality, maybe create a 
financial crisis through poor prudential supervision. 
And, of course, when it comes to countries, national 
interest always comes first, often to the detriment of 
global welfare; this issue is particularly problematic 
in these times of acute nationalism and distrust of 
multilateralism. Today, we see broad indifference to 
global warming, trade wars, fiscal competition and 
other dysfunctionings of the world order.
What is the common feature in all these exam-
ples? It is that the individual interest trumps the 
general (common) interest. Incentives of actors (citi-
zens, firms, government, countries) are inadequate. 
They are not in line with the common good. [I will 
come later to the definition of the common good.]
What can we do? The first thing we can do is to 
try to persuade citizens, firms, states, countries to 
behave better and take into account not only their 
own interests but also the general interest. This is 
what corporate social responsibility 3 and individual 
social responsibility attempt to do: persuade people 
to behave better. Sociologists and social psycholo-
gists emphasise (what they call) norm-based inter-
ventions, namely campaigns and messages that seek 
to alter people’s perceptions of what constitutes 
“normal” behaviour or values among their peers 4. 
3 For example, see my paper co-written with Roland Bénabou 
“Individual and corporate social responsibility”, Economica, 
77:1–19 (2010).
4 Bénabou Roland, Tirole Jean. Laws and Norms. NBER Work-
ing Paper Series. Working Paper 17579; 2011. http://www.
nber.org/papers/w17579. In this paper we analyzed how pri-
vate decisions and public policies are shaped by personal and 
Norm-based interventions here are really about 
trying to change the social norm so that it becomes 
shameful to be selfish.
The second way of dealing with selfish behaviors 
is to provide incentives through taxation or the legal 
system. Sometimes one can combine persuasion and 
incentives. For example, in southern Europe, many 
people used to smoke in restaurants and other public 
places. That misbehavior quickly disappeared. There 
was a prohibition, but at the same time a campaign 
to persuade people that smoking in public places 
was selfish. People stopped smoking in front of oth-
ers even in circumstances where the law obviously 
could not be enforced.
However, there are limits to persuasion. Take 
climate change for example. The Rio summit in 
1992 unveiled some agreement, not as solid as now 
but an agreement nonetheless, that climate change 
was a big threat to humanity. Since then, govern-
ments around the world have provided their citizens 
and companies with little monetary incentive to 
reduce their carbon emissions. Rather, authorities 
have tried to persuade economic agents to change 
their behaviors, to be greener. And the latter have 
not complied. The 5th Report of the IPCC (The In-
tergovernmental Panel on Climate Change —  ed.) 5 
estimates that, following the current trend, the 
average temperature would increase by somewhere 
between 2.5 °C and 7.8 °C by the end of this century, 
after having already increased by almost 1 °C over 
the last century 6.
For an economist, the adequate incentive consists 
in confronting economic agents with a carbon price 
societal preferences (“values”), material or other explicit in-
centives (“laws”) and social sanctions or rewards (“norms”).
5 IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Con-
tribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assess-
ment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change [Core Writing Team, R. K. Pachauri and L. A. Meyer 
(eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, 151 p. https://www.ipcc.
ch/report/ar5/syr/. See also OECD (2018), Effective Car-
bon Rates 2018: Pricing Carbon Emissions through Taxes 
and Emissions Trading, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.
org/10.1787/9789264305304-en. The report presents new data 
on taxes and tradeable permits for carbon emissions in 42 
OECD and G20 countries accounting for around 80% of global 
emissions. It finds that today’s carbon prices —  while slowly 
rising —  are still too low to have a significant impact on curb-
ing climate change. The report shows that the carbon pricing 
gap —  which compares actual carbon prices and real climate 
costs, estimated at 30  €/tCO2 — was 76.5% in 2018. http://
www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-policy/few-countries-are-pricing-car-
bon-high-enough-to-meet-climate-targets.htm.
6 Gollier Christian, Tirole Jean. Negotiating effective institutions 
against climate change (2015) Economics of Energy and 
Environmental Policy, 4(2):5–27.
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for their emissions, either a carbon tax or through a 
carbon cap-and-trade mechanism (tradable emission 
permits, with authorities fixing a cap on possible 
emissions). Such carbon price incentivises indi-
viduals, companies and administrations to emit less 
carbon. However, as I pointed out, very few countries 
have imposed such a carbon price, or when they did 
so, they did it at such a low level that little was done 
to protect the environment- the only two exceptions 
being Switzerland and Sweden. In Europe, the emis-
sions trading system was initially ambitious (as least 
in comparison with policies adopted in other regions 
of the world). However permits’ prices fell drastically 
due to several factors —  recession, investment in 
renewables… —  and the absence of any countervail-
ing reduction in the supply of permits. The carbon 
price went down from a peak of 30 €/tCO2 to around 
5–7 €/tCO2 today. There is so much one can do by 
only trying to persuade; we also need to add real 
incentives to change the individual interest and put 
the general interest back to the centre.
What IS thE COMMON GOOD?
Each of us has a different position in society; we have 
different jobs, different dialects and cultures, differ-
ent tastes, different genders, races and ethnicities, 
different experiences. How do we then define the 
common good? The best we have for this is a thought 
experiment called “the veil of ignorance”. This thought 
experiment thinks in terms of a social contract, and 
has a long philosophical tradition. It goes back to 
England in the 17th century, with Thomas Hobbs and 
John Locke, to continental Europe in the 18th century 
with Immanuel Kant and Jean Jacques Rousseau, and 
also to the US in the 20th century, with scholars such 
as John Rawls and John Harsanyi.
This thought experiment captures a very simple 
idea. Imagine you are not born yet. Because you are 
not born yet, you do not know what your place in 
society will be. You will be born in a rich family or 
a poor family, in a learned family or not. You will be 
born in Russia, France or India. You will be religious 
or agnostic. You will have good genes and resulting 
health, or not. You will be characterized by various 
other traits, such as ethnicity, race, gender, sexual 
preferences, and so on. But you do not know yet 
which will prevail.
So, just imagine that you are not born yet (you 
are behind the veil of ignorance) and ask yourself a 
simple question: what kind of society would I like 
to live in?
Now, let me qualify this a little bit. I do not have 
in mind a La-La land, a world where everybody would 
spontaneously act for the common good. A La-La 
land sounds nice for children, but we do not live in 
that world: we must consider incentives. Russians 
experienced the consequences of the “myth of the 
new man” in Soviet Union times: A man different 
from existing ones, selfless, full of self-control, hard-
working, devoted to society, putting the interests of 
others before, not behind, his self-interest.
Now, some might say that the Soviet Union and 
other regimes, like Eastern Germany, Maoist China, 
and North Korea still today, failed because they 
had the wrong leaders. That is not the issue. The 
conception of society was incorrect. Relying on a 
hypothetical “new man” eventually leads to a to-
talitarian regime. Citizens don’t behave as planned, 
and they then have to be constrained. Which leads 
to such things as the deprivation of freedom as well 
as economic misery. Whether a student, a professor, 
an employee, a politician, a CEO, an NGO worker, 
whatever — we all react to incentives.
Even this very simple thought experiment already 
delivers a number of implications. For example, the 
imperative of offering equal opportunity to citizens. 
Just think of it as of insurance behind the veil of 
ignorance. You do not know where you are going to 
be, in which family you will be born. And you would 
like to enjoy a good education, a right which, by the 
way, is unfortunately often violated: more and more, 
education is akin to an insider trading system in 
many countries; people who have money and who 
are informed of the right subjects and channels 
send their children to the good schools, and others 
do not. Gender equality is similarly a no-brainer 
if one considers the thought experiment in which 
one does not know whether one will be a woman 
or a man. The desirability of religious, ethnic, and 
many other forms of tolerance also results from the 
veil-of-ignorance thought experiment.
Same thing with the access to good medical care 
(universal health care); it is not our fault if we de-
velop cancer; and so we must be insured against the 
cost of treatments. Now, the market may well go 
against that; especially with genetics and artificial 
intelligence: algorithms which predict our future 
health accurately, will select out bad risks for in-
surance purposes. If you are endowed with a “good 
health capital”, you will get very good and cheap 
health insurance, but if you are known to develop 
cancer in the future, then you will pay extremely 
high prices for health insurance, and that is unfair.
Behind the veil of ignorance, we also do not want 
to have monopolies that raise price, offer low qual-
ity services and do not innovate; we do not want to 
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have corruption and so on. So, even with this very 
simple thought experiment, we can go pretty far on 
how society should be organized.
It is our job as economists to deliver tools that 
will promote the common good at a reasonable cost. 
I would like to argue that this requires a long-term 
vision. By contrast, politicians often take a short-
term vision. I am not necessarily blaming politicians. 
Like all of us, they react to their incentives, which 
may well coincide with being elected and staying 
in power. Even if they are decent and honest people, 
they tend to favor the short term over the long term 
because they want to be re-elected or stay in power. 
We, social scientists, face no such constraint and 
must take a long-term view.
DElIVERING thE COMMON GOOD
Next, how does one deliver economics for the com-
mon good? The answer is in the following triptych: 
market-state-social responsibility. The first tool 
is the market, an efficient method of allocating 
scarce resources as long as it is competitive. Espe-
cially in comparison with public ownership of pro-
duction means. Continued state ownership 7 indeed 
may not be a good thing, for several reasons. The 
first is the existence of an implicit state guaran-
tee. A state-owned bank or enterprise faces lower 
incentive to make itself sustainable, as the state’s 
implicit guarantee will allow it to refinance even 
under lackluster performance. Second, the implicit 
guarantee destroys the level playing field with the 
private sector, which does not have access to such 
backstops. Third, there may be some pressure on 
the firms and banks under state control to pursue 
specific political goals.
But there are also lots of market failures. Indeed, 
researchers in economics deal mostly with market 
failures. Which market failures? First, market power, 
the ability of large firms to raise prices, to lower 
quality, and to fail to innovate. Large firms do not 
innovate because they do not want to cannibalise 
their own products.
But there are many other markets failures: mar-
kets may be marred by incomplete or asymmetric 
information. A depositor does not know whether 
her bank has sound balance-sheet and off-balance-
sheet positions, and therefore does not have the 
information required to assess whether her deposits 
are safe. Similarly, the purchaser of food in a shop 
7 Transient state ownership may be fine, as shown by the crea-
tion of bad banks in reaction to the banking crisis in Scandina-
via in the early 90’s.
or a restaurant patron has no way of investigating 
the food chain behind what he is going to eat. A 
patient cannot know about the therapeutic or ad-
dictive properties of a molecule (see e. g. the recent 
opioid crisis). Etc. This is why we have consumer 
protection agencies.
There may be externalities (I reduce the welfare 
of others when I emit carbon, fail to vaccinate my 
children, overconsume antibiotics, etc). When I use 
my car, I pollute the environment and deteriorate 
the climate, but the consequences of my actions 
are borne by everyone else in the world. I may also 
contribute to street congestion, exerting another 
negative externality onto others.
There may be “internalities” as when we fail to 
act in our own self-interest. One can even think of 
inequality as of a market failure, since there is no 
reason why a market would deliver the distribution 
of income that we would have dreamt of before 
knowing our place in society.
The correction of these market failures requires 
a strong state; one that is independent from lobbies, 
has integrity and applies the precepts of the com-
mon good. In my view, the modern state is a referee, 
not a player. The state should correct market fail-
ures (guarantee equal opportunities in health and 
education, implement redistribution, competition 
policy and regulation, environmental and consumer 
protection, etc).
People often said in the wake of the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis that we do not need finance. That is 
a wrong idea. Finance is indispensable. It allows 
all sorts of economic agents- households, firms, 
states- to borrow and hedge themselves against 
various risks. Financial institutions also create sav-
ing products for these actors. The financial crisis 
of 2008 was a crisis of the state, a crisis of regula-
tion. Lenient regulation and supervision created 
the wrong incentives. Weak regulation implies that 
some unscrupulous actors will take advantage of the 
loopholes and wrong incentives, exploit the system 
pitilessly. It is one thing to blame the financial in-
dustry for doing the wrong things, and yes, some 
people are not very honest and take advantage of 
these wrong incentives. However, the state should 
not create wrong incentives in the first place. Take 
financial bubbles, where politics were very much 
involved. In countries such as the US and Spain, 
politicians wanted people to own houses and apart-
ments and create a construction boom; they pushed 
banks to lend to real estate construction companies 
and regulated leniently both mortgages and their 
securitization. The rest is history, as they say. For 
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instance, there was a huge recession in Spain and 
the human suffering was tremendous.
Many people think of the market and the state as 
substitutes. However, they should be complementary, 
in the sense that the market occasionally needs 
some regulation to function well; and, conversely, 
the state needs incentives. When they both fail, 
we have to appeal to our social responsibility, as 
individuals and as corporations.
PRECEPtS fOR GOOD PUblIC POlICY
That brings me to the public policy. The design of 
the state often does not match the economy of the 
21stcentury. Let us enunciate three principles for 
this design.
The first precept is to avoid hubris. The state 
should not try to do things that it cannot do be-
cause it does not have the information. For example, 
suppose that the state wants to reduce pollution. 
One possibility is to set a price for carbon, and let 
companies and households decide whether they 
want to pollute the environment or pay the carbon 
tax. That policy requires no information as to who 
is best placed to reduce pollution; the existence of 
a uniform carbon price ensures that those agents 
with the lowest abatement cost will actually abate, 
ensuring a reduction in pollution at minimum cost.
Same idea, if you want to use incentives in the 
labour market: Because the state does not know 
which employee is needed by a company and which 
is not, it is best advised to employ what in the US is 
called “experience rating”. This policy consists in 
making the company internalize at least in part the 
cost that it imposes on the unemployment benefit 
scheme when a worker is laid off (which is distinct 
from severance pay, which corresponds to the inter-
nalization of externality on the employee). Here too, 
the state be humble; it must take into account that 
it often does not have the information required to 
efficiently control and direct each economic deci-
sion; instead it must align the interests of the firm 
with those of the broader society.
The second point is that our societies should some-
times resist the call for “political primacy”. Politi-
cal accountability is not adequate for all decisions. 
There are many instances of successful independ-
ent agencies. A case in point is competition policy. 
When in the past competition policy was executed 
by the ministry, the CEO of a powerful company 
that was threatened by an antitrust lawsuit would 
call the minister and ask for political interference 
in the case. Economic arguments were sometimes 
of little importance; it was more important to have 
been in school with, or be a friend of the minister. 
Since the 1980s, independent authorities are in 
charge of anti-trust policies in Europe; and, al-
though I don’t agree with each and every decision, 
much better anti-trust enforcement has occured. 
Another case in point is the legal system. In the 
Anglo-Saxon tradition, it has long been accepted 
that courts should be independent of the govern-
ment; this independence is very important indeed, 
in order to protect minorities against the majority 
and to ensure that the powerful do not enjoy im-
munity from prosecution.
A final case in point is central bank independ-
ence. In many countries around the world, the rise 
of populism comes together with a call for making 
the central banks come under the thumb of the 
political power. In the name of “accountability”. 
To give two examples among many, the current US 
President keeps criticising the Federal Reserve, and 
the Prime Minister of India has been fighting with 
the Reserve Bank of India, the central bank. At-
tacks on central bank independence are also fueled 
by central banks’ large balance sheets. They have 
bought many bonds from various countries, usu-
ally their own; and, substituting for elected offi-
cials, who do not dare to do it, they take on some 
fiscal role by lending to various countries such as 
Greece. That may jeopardize the independence of 
the central bank.
We need independent central banks for at least 
two reasons. One is monetary policy. Independent 
central banks are better at confronting inflation. 
Before central banks became independent entities, 
there was often a strong inflation as the politicians 
wanted to get some stimulus just before the election 
(“pump priming”); they were concerned about being 
re-elected. Politicians usually want lower interest 
rates. The low-interest rate policy can be fine in cer-
tain circumstances, and indeed independent central 
bankers did the right thing after 2008 by lowering 
the interest rate. They thought that the financial 
system was too risky and they tried to keep the 
credit flowing to companies. However, this should 
be done for economic reasons and not for political 
reasons. We need independent central banks with 
talented people in the top jobs. Central banks are 
also engaged in the prudential supervision of banks. 
Independent central banks are better at maintaining 
capital standards. They also make mistakes, to be 
certain, but at least, they are protected from politi-
cal will: politicians cannot impose a relaxation of 
capital standards, or favour their friends, or simply 
cause credits flowing into the economy.
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As I said earlier, blaming politicians for flawed 
policies will not get us very far. Sure, sometimes they 
deserve blame. While some are competent, honest 
and courageous, others are not. However it is very 
difficult to build institutions on the premise that 
politicians —  or any economic agent for that matter — 
will systematically put the common good ahead of 
their own self-interest. Like all of us, they respond 
to the incentives they face, in their case the desire 
to stay in power. So, for democracy to work, one 
has to build checks and balances inside and outside 
the government, from independent authorities to 
strong, unconnected media and political competi-
tion keeping the government on its toes. Another 
important counter-power in this era of fake news 
and bad reasoning is a good and critical education; 
we must train pupils and students so that when they 
are confronted with a fake fact or a flawed argument, 
they get the chance to detect it and understand that 
they are being manipulated. Otherwise, we, the 
citizens, get the policies we deserve.
thE ECONOMISt’S MISSION
Economists have sometimes had a bad press, espe-
cially since the financial crisis. Some of the criti-
cism is warranted and some is not. There are pit-
falls for the economics profession. Our judgment 
may be impaired by financial conflicts of interest, 
political friendships or ambitions for public recog-
nition. Being on TV, on the radio, in newspapers is 
flattering. But it does not necessarily promote the 
common good.
We must also accept that we economists are not 
always good at communicating. In particular, we 
often fail to communicate what we are good at and 
bad at. We are better at analysing situations and 
drawing implications for policy than at predicting. 
I am currently worried about the potential for a new 
financial crisis. I can describe to you why, but if you 
ask me when it is going to come —  in a month, or 
5 years, or never at all — I will not be able to tell 
you. A bit like a doctor who will diagnose potential 
frailty and recommend remedies, but is completely 
unable to predict the timing; or a seismologist who 
cannot predict the date of occurrence of an earth-
quake. And we do not share enough our knowledge 
with the wider audience. The reason why I wrote 
The Economics for the Common Good was precisely 
to share knowledge with an audience wider than 
just experts. I have been talking to experts in busi-
ness and governments for 30 years. But the wider 
public must also have access to expert knowledge 
for democracy to flourish.
We must also be humble. Sometimes, we have 
insufficient information about numbers; for example, 
in the onset of the financial crisis, most economists 
had insufficient knowledge of the magnitude of the 
exposure of banks to over-the-counter markets (OTC 
markets), and of the extent to which they shifted 
risk to the so-called conduits. We knew that such 
practices could be dangerous, but were mostly ig-
norant of their extent.
And then we must accept the fact that the eco-
nomics, although it is a science, is not an exact sci-
ence. Besides the facts that good data may be una-
vailable and that theories may oversimplify, there is 
also a specificity of the social sciences. Agents follow 
different and sometimes unpredictable behavioural 
patterns. For example, self-fulfilling phenomena 
(a bank run, a run on a currency) describe behaviors 
in which people engage only because others do as 
well. This makes it very difficult to predict when a 
crisis may happen.
The next thing I want to mention is when commu-
nicating, we must confront our audience’s cognitive 
biases (biases to which we ourselves are exposed). 
Thus, Economics for the Common Good spends time 
explaining how these cognitive biases make com-
munication of science, not only economics, difficult. 
There are many cognitive biases that we could dis-
cuss, but let me focus on two.
Motivated beliefs refer to the observation that 
we believe what we want to believe. We see what we 
want to see. We dream of a different world, where 
accidents or incidents would not happen to ourselves 
and our loved ones. This blissful ignorance has real 
consequences as we may forego a medical check-up 
or not put our safety belt when driving. But there is 
also some functionality in it. We live happier when 
avoiding unpleasant thoughts. If we thought about 
death all the time, for example, then we would not 
live a happy life.
In the economic realm, we dream of a world in 
which people were nicer and one would not have to 
force people to drive slowly or companies to stop 
polluting or to avoid taxes. We want to believe in 
green growth. Many politicians say they want to 
fight climate change, and that “by the way, if we 
are green, we are going to grow faster”. If you have 
a critical mind, you may ask: “If we grow faster by 
being green, why do not we do it now?” Somehow 
the official discourse makes little sense. The truth 
is that if we want to be green, we have to accept a 
small reduction in purchasing power and it is en-
tirely worth it. To save our planet, it is worth losing 
a bit of GDP.
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Similarly, people hope that the public debt will 
go away: somebody else will pay or there will be no 
crisis. Overall we believe what we want to believe 
and of course that makes the work of the economist 
harder, because the economists are the bearer of 
bad news: they convey news that many citizens do 
not want to hear. And by the way, populists — the 
left wing and the right wing — both play with our 
demand for rosy beliefs. They promote the vision 
of the economy free of difficult choices. But let’s 
leave it to them.
The other point is that we as economists are 
trained to think globally, that is about the overall 
effects of a policy. Let me give you only one exam-
ple for the sake of time. Think about rent control. 
In an expensive city, people with low income or 
middle income cannot afford their own housing. 
So policies that cap rental prices are popular. They 
are well-meaning because they try to help peo-
ple with little money. The direct beneficiaries of 
this policy are people who are already renting a 
flat, and are geographically stable. However, under 
a rent control there will soon be a supply short-
age —  what has indeed happened in many cities in 
the world. In the longer term, apartements are no 
longer maintained and even “beneficiaries” end up 
with an apartment that is completely run down. And 
the future generations will no longer have access 
to decent apartments. We economists must think 
beyond beneficiaries and look at indirect victims.
Let me conclude. Contrary to a widespread feel-
ing, economists can be more valuable now than 
they have ever been. For that, though, they must 
be lucid about the pitfalls of their science. And like 
experts more broadly, they must confront populism, 
which is rampant or dominant around the world. 
The populists are extremely good at playing on 
our frustrations and fears, and frustrations and 
fears there are: the global financial crisis, the euro 
crisis, unemployment, the slowdown of economic 
growth, growing debt, job-destroying technologies 
(AI, robots), climate change, migration and so on. 
Populists exploit these fears and frustrations to 
foster widespread hostility to immigrants, distrust 
of free trade and xenophobia. And of course, peo-
ple with expert knowledge are dismissed. Yet we 
need experts. Not because experts are infallible, 
but because a democracy cannot function without 
respect for expert knowledge: Otherwise “anything 
goes”. We must prepare for the digital revolution 
and protect consumers and citizens. We must save 
our planet for our children; we must make sure 
that the financial system is safe, reduce inequality 
within and between countries, and at the same time 
maintain a high growth rate.
I am confident that generosity and intelligence 
will prevail against populism and nationalism. 
Students at the Financial University, please be as-
sured that what you are studying today, your expert 
knowledge matters; keep retraining in the future, 
keep your critical mind, so in your work life and as 
a citizen, you will keep using the correct analysis 
and expressing the right argument. And above all, 
never lose track of the common good.
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